Price volatility and the political economy of resource-rich nations by Ahmed Saber, Mahmud & Syed Abul, Basher
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Price volatility and the political economy
of resource-rich nations
Mahmud Ahmed Saber and Basher Syed Abul
10. June 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56564/
MPRA Paper No. 56564, posted 13. June 2014 08:21 UTC
Price Volatility and the Political Economy of
Resource-Rich Nations
Ahmed Saber Mahmudy
amahmud2@jhu.edu
Syed Abul Basherz
syed.basher@gmail.com
June 10, 2014
Abstract
This paper attempts to understand how price volatility aects the political transition of a
resource-rich nation. Two states reect price volatility: `high prices' and `low prices'. We
argue that whether or not political transition (i.e., a switch from one regime to another) will
take place in a particular state depends critically on the kind of goods a country produces.
If the main economic activity in a country is the extraction of \point-source" resources
such as oil that demands capital-intensive production, the opportunity cost of switching the
existing regime does not alter if the price of the resource changes but the benet becomes
more lucrative. Therefore, the incumbent group is most vulnerable during `high prices'.
If the main economic activity of the nations is the production of \diused resources" that
requires labor such as coee, prices do aect the opportunity cost. Nations concentrating
in these commodities, face acute political crisis during downturns.
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1 Introduction
Common features of commodity-producing countries are the enormous price swings that lead
to equally enormous swings in export revenues, leading to boom-and-bust cycles that tend
to persist for several years at a time. Reviewing the long-runs data on the prices of three
important African crops|cotton, coee and cocoa|Deaton (1999, p. 27) made the very wise
observation that: \what commodity prices lack in trend, they make up for in variance." Deaton's
observation applies equally to the price of oil, the most widely tracked commodity price in the
world. It is also observed that even though boom-and-bust periods last longer, the scal policy
of resource-rich nations tends to be procyclical.
The present study attempts to understand how price volatility aects the political economy
of a resource-rich nation. Our model is applicable to nations that are economically dependent
upon revenues from selling natural resources in the international market where the price of this
natural resource is subject to signicant swings. Two states reect price volatility: `high prices'
and `low prices'. We consider two types of resources: point-source and diused. To explore
point-source resources, capital-intensive advanced technology is required. In contrast, diused
resources are explored by labor-intensive techniques.
In our framework, there are two groups: the rich (minority) and the poor (majority). The
rich possess more of the diused resources than the poor majority. The point-source resource
is owned by the group that is in power. When the rich minority holds the power, the country is
under autocracy and when the poor dominate, the country is under democracy. Redistribution
takes place via a transfer of revenue earned from selling the point-source resource and an im-
posing tax on the diused resource. The group in power redistributes in their own favor. Either
group has the ability to force a switch to a regime in their favor.
In Acemoglu and Robinson (2009), the risk of revolution against autocrats (or the risk of
coup against democracies) is highest in transitory economic downturns. This is because the
opportunity cost of staging a revolution (or a coup) is lowest in these downturns. This theory
found evidence, for example, in Bruckner and Ciccone (2011). In contrast, we argue that the
result above depends critically on the kind of goods a country produces.1 When the main
economic activity in a country is extraction of point resources such as oil, the opportunity cost
does not alter if the price of the resource changes while the benet from becoming the incumbent
1We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this argument.
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is more lucrative. Therefore, there is strong risk of revolutions or coups when the price of the
point-source commodity is high. If the main economic activity in a country is the production
of diused resources (which are labor intensive, and thus hard to expropriate, such as coee),
then Acemoglu and Robinson's result holds: opportunity cost of a revolution or coup is lowest
when the price of the commodity is lowest. This is the main nding of our paper. Our other
results can be summarized as follows.
In the case of point-source resources such as oil and natural gas:
 What causes procyclical scal policy? Fiscal procyclicality (commonly dubbed the boom{
bust cycle) is dened as the ramping up of sometimes inecient spending after positive
revenue shocks, and abrupt expenditure reductions after adverse shocks (Ghura and Pat-
tillo et al. 2012). More concretely, in boom years, the commodity export price is above
the 75th percentile; in bust years, it is below the 25th percentile (see Kaminsky et al.
2005). We argue that when the price of lumpy resources such as oil is high, the incumbent
government faces strong (political) pressure to redistribute wealth. As a result, spending
increases. When the price of the commodity is low, such pressure is less intense and hence
the spending does not have to match the previous high levels.
 Does price volatility lead to political instability? An increase in price volatility implies even
higher prices during boom periods and an equally low price during bust periods. This
uctuation allows the incumbent group to redistribute the resource wealth to the non-
incumbent group when the political pressure is most intense. This allows the incumbent
to avert potential political crises. Therefore, political instability is avoided when the
regime is under threat.
In the case of diused resources such as coee and cocoa, we ask:
 When is the existing regime most vulnerable? Unlike point-source resources, natural re-
sources that are diused, such as agricultural commodities (which are labor-intensive),
may pose a challenge during a low-price state, as the opportunity cost of rebellion is low.
Therefore, both rebellions and coups are more probable when the price is low.
 Does price volatility lead to political instability? Increased price volatility decreases the
opportunity cost of a revolution during recessions in the case of diused resources. There-
fore, both coups and revolutions become more probable events and political instability
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is enhanced. This, however, presupposes that regimes are under threat when prices are
low. If regimes are under threat when prices are high, the reverse occurs where political
instability is reduced, due to more uctuations in prices.
1.1 Related Literature
In the context of political economy, political instability has been linked to price shocks (Alesina
et al. 1996; Blattman and Miguel 2010). Two opposing views exist. The rst view considers
the rise in price as an increase in resource rents that induces the political non-incumbent to
challenge the existing regime. The second view considers the impact of price shocks on the
incentive of individuals to rebel. A decline in commodity prices lowers the opportunity cost and
hence conict becomes more probable.
Employing new and comprehensive price shock data, Bazzi and Blattman (2011) found
that commodity price shocks have no discernible eect on the onset of new conicts, but have
some eect on ongoing conict. Their results support the ndings of Dube and Vargas (2013),
who showed that price shocks aect conict in opposite directions depending on the factor
intensity of the commodity. Using a unique violence related data-set from Columbia, Dube and
Vargas (2013) found that a fall in the price of coee (which is labor-intensive) increases violence
disproportionately in municipalities growing more coee. However, a rise in the price of oil
(which is capital-intensive) intensies attacks disproportionately in municipalities that produce
more oil.
Our paper does not focus upon the impact of a resource boom on an ongoing civil war but
discusses whether or not a boom can cause political transition. We illustrate that a boom in
point-source resources causes regime instability, while the increased price volatility can stabilise
the regime through more redistribution when the political pressure is as its most intense. In
the case of diused resources, a boom in natural resources leads to more democratization, while
increased price volatility leads to more political instability. This is because lower prices during
recessions cause lower opportunity costs and more incentives for the rich to mount a coup and
the poor to rebel.
The nature of scal policy during business cycles diers across nations. This behavior was
rst documented in the seminal work of Gavin and Perotti (1997). Numerous studies document
how the cyclical nature of scal policy diers across countries belonging to dierent income
brackets. For instance, in Kaminsky et al. (2005), the cyclical correlation between a country's
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government spending and gross domestic product (GDP) over the 1960{2003 period ranged from
{1 for Finland (denoting a strongly countercyclical policy) to +1 for Oman (denoting a strongly
procyclical policy). In their analysis, the majority of the commodity-exporting countries ex-
hibited procyclical spending, compared with advanced countries. This nding is corroborated
by Akitoby et al. (2004), Alesina and Tabellini (2005), Talvi and Vegh (2005), and Ilzetzki
and Vegh (2008), who found evidence of scal procyclicality in a large sample of developing
countries.
In general, industrial countries with established democracies tend to pursue countercyclical
policies, whereas developing countries with less consolidated political regimes (dened in the
next section) pursue procyclical policies. For nations rich in point-source resources, in boom
years, it is dicult for a government to resist the temptation (or avoid the political pressure)
to spend proportionally, resulting in a large scal budget encompassing higher subsidies, more
public sector employment, higher public sector wages and lucrative government contracts to
local businesses.2 However, once the world prices for exported commodity goods drop, most
governments nd it dicult to reverse their current expenditure (e.g., subsidies and wages) and
rely more on cutting capital expenditure. In a panel study of 32 oil-producing countries over the
1992{2009 period, Arezki and Ismail (2012) found that current government spending increases
in boom times, but is downward-sticky. Furthermore, the volatility of total spending is over 60
percent higher in resource-rich countries than in their non-resource counterparts (Ghura and
Pattillo et al. 2012).
What is the underlying motive for pursuing procyclical scal policies in developing nations
in general? The two most convincing explanations are:
1. Imperfections in credit markets (Gavin and Perotti 1997; Riascos and Vegh 2003): Less
access to credit markets during recessions forces the governments to cut expenditure during
bad times when it is most needed.
2. Distorted political incentives (Tornell and Lane 1999; Talvi and Vegh 2005): An increase
in government receipts from taxes or mineral royalties during booms raises the political
pressure to spend more. The present study belongs to this second group.
2This phenomenon of \petro-populism", where the incumbent government relies on excessive use of natural
resource revenues to buy political support, is used to describe the regime and policy of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez
(sembrar el petroleo|to sow the oil), Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad election promise (\Put the oil money on
everyone's dinner table") and the economic policy of Russia's Vladimir Putin as a \Petro-Czar". See Matsen et
al. (2012) for further discussion.
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In theory, commodity-exporting nations in particular have several ways to deal with the
volatility of natural resource revenue. Frankel (2012), for example, oers a menu of choices
which encompass risk diversication such as hedging export proceeds on option markets (as
implemented by Mexico), countercyclical macroeconomic policies (such as the Chilean-style
scal rules) and good governance institutions (like Botswana's \Pula Fund", which is not subject
to political inuence). However, in practice, scal policy tends to be procyclical in the majority
of the commodity-exporting developing countries.
Though the concepts are related, expansionary or contractionary scal policies should be
dierentiated from policies that redistribute wealth from the incumbent group to the non-
incumbent { the primary focus of our paper. Fiscal policies also include projects that transfer
wealth within the incumbent group. Two nations may have expansionary scal policies to the
same degree but a distinction can exist with regards to the identity of the beneciary.
According to our paper, when a nation possesses a signicant amount of point-source re-
sources, the incumbent regime is under pressure during boom periods. Therefore, incumbents
need to transfer wealth to the rest during these periods. Sometimes, the maximum possi-
ble transfer may not ensure the continuation of the regime and this will lead to a change in
regimes. In the case of diused resources, the regimes are under pressure when the price is low.
The combination of democracy and diused resources will lead to similar procyclical redistribu-
tion policies, as the poor can freely tax the rich. In contrast, autocracy and diused resources
will lead to a countercyclical policy with regards to redistribution. Therefore, more interesting
variations are observed.
With commodity prices being the leading indicator of economic well-being in many resource-
rich economies, the impact of commodity price volatility on economic growth has also been
studied by economists at length. Although, in general, a negative link between commodity
price volatility and growth performance has been observed, the actual extent of this relationship
varies greatly from country to country. Dierences among countries in terms of their level of
nancial development, their absorption capacity and the quality of their institutions, among
others, play important roles in safeguarding the economy against volatility. These hypotheses
are supported by recent empirical studies involving cross-country examination of commodity-
exporting countries. For instance, van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) observed that the direct
positive eect of resources on growth is negated by the indirect negative eect of volatility.
In an extensive survey of the literature, van der Ploeg (2011) gathered econometric evidence
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supporting the notion that the volatility of resource windfalls is the quintessence of the resource
curse, as well as the hypothesis that the negative eect on growth is lower in countries with
well-developed nancial systems. We do not focus upon economic development in this paper.
However, we show that political instability can occur due to resource booms, which handicaps
the development process.
Aside from price volatility, the dynamic nature of a political contest between rival factions
competing for natural resource rents and the attendant commitment problems have been studied
extensively in theory. For our present endeavor, the most relevant works are Acemoglu and
Robinson (2009), and Dunning (2009). The framework built in Acemoglu and Robinson (2009)
is equipped to analyze the stability of political regimes under volatility. Dunning (2009, ch. 3),
using the same framework, derived conditions that allow one to investigate how the political
equilibria vary as a function of changing levels of the resource rents, when the private (non-
resource) economy is more non-egalitarian. According to Dunning (2009), when there is a deep
division between rich and poor in a society, the existence of a resource ushers in a new source
of redistribution, leading towards a democratic outcome.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a simple theoretical
framework for understanding how the price volatility of natural resources aects political out-
comes. Sections 3 and 4 present the main results and comparative statics for point-source and
diused resources, respectively. Section 5 discusses the empirical implications of our results.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment
Income is obtained from two sources { point-source and diused resources. Diuse resource
such as coee is hard to expropriate, as they are labor-intensive; but point-source resource such
as oil is easier to expropriate, as they are more capital-intensive and less labor-intensive. In
our model, point-source resources do not require any labor and income is earned from pure
transfers. Diused resources are produced by individuals and labor endowment is dispersed
dierently across groups. The rich (the minority) possess yr and the poor (the majority) have
yp of the diused resources, where yr > yp. The rich are also less numerous (only  < 12 of the
population).
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The price of each resource can vary. There are two states in each period: (a) high prices
(PH) with probability s and (b) low prices (PL) with probability (1  s). The total income Y it
obtained by each agent includes: the nominal value of the diused resource, taxes imposed on
diused resources and transfers from point-source resources. Each agent (who has an innite
lifetime) maximizes the discounted sum of his or her lifetime income (the same as utility):
U i = E0
1X
t=0
tY it
Initially (at period 0), the rich are in power or autocracy prevails, and the rich decide the trans-
fers and taxes. If autocracy exists, the poor can rebel. In response, the rich can democratize,
where the poor, being more numerous, win the election and the poor will decide the taxes and
transfers. In a revolution, the poor redistribute the assets, which include both diused and
point-source resources, among themselves and the rich obtain nothing.3 As everyone is equal
afterwards, inter-group conict no longer exists.
The game lasts for innite number of periods. The game in each period is as follows:
1. Nature chooses the price fPH ; PLg with Pr (PH) = s:
2. If a revolution has occurred in the past, the poor consume the income during the revolu-
tion. If the rich are in power (under autocracy), the rich select the transfer to the poor.
If the poor are in power (under democracy), the poor select the transfer to the rich.
3. The poor decide whether to rebel or not at an initial cost of (1 ) of their income if the
rich are in power. Under a democracy, the rich decide whether to restore autocracy by
mounting a coup at a cost of (1  ) of their income.
4. When the poor decide to rebel, the rich can decide to extend the franchise by establishing
democracy { this entails no cost. If the rich decide otherwise, revolution occurs. If
democracy is oered by the rich, the poor decide whether or not to carry out the revolution.
5. Everyone consumes and the period ends.
Autocracy and democracy have three separate sub-categories:4
3Democracy is a compromise between the poor and the rich that can be attained without cost. The rich do
not suer from the asset redistributions caused by a revolution and the poor benets from increased taxation on
the rich without incurring the cost of revolution. Therefore, when there is a potential threat of revolution, this
compromise is an option for the rich to alleviate the threat.
4For a further description of the distinction between fully consolidated and semi-consolidated democracies,
see Acemoglu and Robinson (2009, Ch. 7).
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 Under consolidated regimes, the party in power (rich or poor) does not need to distribute
any wealth to `the others' (irrespective of whether the current state is PH or PL).
 Under semi-consolidated regimes, the party in power (rich or poor) needs to distribute
some wealth to `the others' to prevent usurpation of power by `the others'.
 Under unconsolidated regimes, the party in power (rich or poor) cannot prevent `the others'
coming into power even after maximum possible redistribution.
2.2 Equilibrium
The poor and the rich can be treated as two separate agents that make the decision to mount
a revolution or launch a coup. This game is a repeated game between the two groups. The
equilibrium concept is that of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), where strategies depend only
on the current state of the world and the prior actions taken within the same period. The state
S is one of (Pj ; A), (Pj ; D) and (Pj ; R), where A;D and R refers to autocracy, democracy and
revolution, respectively.
The strategy of the rich is given by r (Sjtp). S is the state and tp is the transfer decision
taken by the poor when S = (Pj ; D). This strategy includes the actions of the rich, f; &; trg,
where (i)  = 1 implies the extension of the franchise (i.e., democratization), whereas  =
0 implies no such action; (ii) & = 1 indicates that the rich have decided to launch a coup
when S = (Pj ; D) and & = 0 indicates the rich have no such intention; (iii) nally, t
r is the
redistribution set by the rich to the poor when S = (Pi; A). The strategy of the poor is
likewise denoted as p (Sj; tr), and depends on the state S and extension of the franchise in
the case of autocracy. This leads to the strategy of the poor f; tpg:  = 1 indicates that
there is a revolution and  = 0 implies that there is no revolution. If there is no revolution
and the state is (Pj ; D), the redistribution is set at t
p: If  = 1, a revolution has occurred
and the state is (Pj ; R): Transitions between the states are as follows: starting from (Pj ; A); if
there is a revolution or  = 1; the state is (Pj ; R). After the revolution, the rich departs as a
defeated group and resources are distributed equally among the poor. Since everyone has the
same amount of resources, no conict over distribution of resources can take place. If there is
democatization or  = 1, we arrive at (Pj ; D). If we start from (Pj ; D), mounting a coup or
& = 1 will lead to (Pj ; A):
A pure strategy MPE is a strategy combination denoted by fbr (Sjtp) ; bp (Sj; tr)g; such
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that br are the best responses to each other at all possible states. More formally, consider the
following Bellman equations:
V r(S) =
max
r

Cr (bp (Sj; tr) ; r; S) +  Z V r(S0)d   bp  S0j; tr ; r; S
V p(S) =
max
p

Cp (p; br (Sjtp) ; S) +  Z V p(S0)d  (p; br (Sjtp) ; S)
where the consumption of agents are a function of the state and strategies.   () indicates the
probability distribution function of transition from the state S to the state S0. A pure strategy
MPE is a strategy combination such that br (Sjtp) solves the rst equation and bp (Sj; tr)
solves the second equation simultaneously.
3 Point-Source Resources
We consider a lumpy kind of resource such as oil or minerals. Exploration for this kind of
resource requires capital-intensive technology. During periods of high prices (PH), the value of
the point-source resource is PHW ; under low prices, the value is PLW . The rich (the minority)
obtain a higher income, yr, than the poor (the majority), yp, from diused resources (such as
land) that are not related to the aforementioned resource. The rich have more diused resources
than the poor and are less numerous (only  < 12 of the population). In this section, we allow
the price of a point-source resource to vary but the price of the diused resource is constant at
unity.
The wealth associated with point resources is distributed by the group in power. If the
rich are in power (under autocracy), the rich select the transfer (1   j); j 2 fH for PH ; L for
PLg to the poor from the point-source resource (oil wealth). If the poor are in power (under
democracy), the poor select the transfer j ; j 2 fH for PH ; L for PLg to the rich from the oil
wealth. There is no taxation in this game. The reason for this is two-fold. First, resource-rich
countries have a very low level of taxation. Second, we intend to illustrate that there could
be other reasons for democratization (when resources are unearthed) that are not related to
taxation, complementing the analysis of Dunning (2009).
In sum, we distinguish between two sources of income: one related to diused resources (yi)
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and the other from transfer of point-source resource wealth (PjW ):
Y rt = y
r + (1  j)PjW
Y pt = y
p + jPjW:
The net benet for the rich and the poor to mount a coup and a revolution are respectively
as follows:
V r(CoupjPj) = yr + PjW +


Z
V r(S0)d 
 bp  S0j; tr ; br; S  (1  )yr
V p(RevjPj) = y + PjW + 
1   [s(y + PHW ) + (1  s)(y + PLW )]  (1  )y
p
The rst two terms in the above equations constitute the total benets over time and the
last term represents the cost. Note that in both cases the cost is independent of the level of
prices but the benet is positively related.
3.1 Analysis
The expected ex-ante benets of consolidated regimes (when no transfer is provided to the
non-incumbent group; (denoted by superscript c) are:
EV p(Ac) =
yp
1   (1)
EV r(Ac) =
1
1   [s (y
r + PHW ) + (1  s) (yr + PLW )] (2)
EV p(Dc) =
1
1   [s (y
p + PHW ) + (1  s) (yp + PLW )] (3)
EV r(Dc) =
yr
1   (4)
where  denotes the discount factor. Equations (1) and (2) show the payos for the poor
majority and rich minority, respectively, that would apply if the society remains non-democratic
all the time (i.e., no revolution) and the rich never redistribute wealth to the citizens and vice
versa. Equations (3) and (4) mirror the previous payos in the opposing way, respectively, for
the poor and rich when the society remains in democracy, without any signicant reversals in
the process.
The payo to the poor from a revolution is carried out in the previous period (the poor
redistribute the assets that include resource and non-resource wealth among themselves and the
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rich obtain nothing) is:
EV p(R) =
1
1   [s (y + PHW ) + (1  s) (y + PLW )]
where y = y
r+(1 )yp
(1 ) is the amount of diused resources obtained by the poor after complete
redistribution following the revolution. The benet of mounting a coup by the rich is high
when the price is high because there is more benet from oil wealth. For simplicity, we assume
that there is no benet in opting for a coup by the rich when the price is low. For the rich,
the maximum benet from a coup can be obtained when a consolidated autocracy (Ac) is
established from a consolidated democracy (Dc). If this maximum benet is not protable
under the low-price state (PL) then a coup is not a threat under PL. We have:
V r(CoupjPL)  V r(DcjPL) (5)
yr + PLW + EV
r(Ac)  (1  )yr  yr + EV r(Dc) (6)
In particular, we have the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Point-source resource): Under PL, a coup is not protable.
Similarly, the benet of revolution by the poor is high when the price is high because there
is more benet from oil wealth or the point-source resource. As above, we assume that there
is no benet in opting for a revolution by the poor when the price is low. For the poor, the
maximum benet from revolution can be obtained when the regime is a consolidated autocracy
(Ac). If this maximum benet is not protable under PL, then a revolution is not a threat
under PL. We have:
V p(RevjPL)  V p(AcjPL) (7)
y + PLW + EV
p(Rev)  (1  )yp  yp + EV p(Ac) (8)
We shall make a similar assumption:
Assumption 2 (Point-source resource): Under PL, a revolution is not protable.
When a revolution has occurred, the political system has reached its nal stage and the
system cannot be reversed. Since we are interested in a regime's instability, we use revolution
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as a credible threat to prompt the rich to democratize rather than as an option (i.e., we want to
eliminate the possibility of a revolution occurring). The lowest possible payo under democracy
is an unconsolidated one (Du) { a regime that alternates between democracy and autocracy. If
revolution is not protable at all, even at PH , then all other forms of democracy (consolidated
or semi-consolidated) are better than mounting a revolution. Hence, extending the franchise
can restrain revolutionary fervor:
V p(RevjPH) = y + PHW + EV p(Rev)  (1  )yp  V p(DujPH) (9)
This leads us to the following assumption:
Assumption 3 (Point-source resource): Even under PH , the poor prefer an unconsolidated
democracy over a revolution.
The assumption that existing regimes are not under threat during low prices is not required
for our results. This simplies our calculations. In the case of point-source resources, the oppor-
tunity cost of switching regimes does not alter due to price volatility but the benet does. This
is why when the price is high, the rich (under democracy) have an incentive to mount a coup and
the poor (under autocracy) have an incentive to rebel. When prices are high, semi-consolidated
regimes transfer wealth to the non-incumbents to avoid a regime switch. Such pressure is non-
existent when the price is low. Competing explanations of such scal procyclicality have already
been mentioned. Recently, Endegnanew (2012) showed that countries experience a procyclical
scal policy mainly as a result of weak institutions in good times, and combination of weak
institutions and a lack of nancial integration in bad times. A more unfortunate scenario arises
when even the maximum amount of transfer cannot prevent a coup or a revolution. During
high prices, nations make a transition from one regime to another (i.e., unconsolidated regimes
are formed).
We assume that the economy begins with autocracy. However, depending on the cost of
revolutions and coups, this may change. As mentioned earlier, it is during boom periods that
the incumbent regime faces political challenge. Therefore, the subsequent analysis focuses upon
periods when the price of natural resources is high.
Let V r(DsjPH) denote the payo of the rich under a semi-consolidated democracy, where
the rich can appropriate the resource only when the price is high. Let V r(AcjPH) be the
payo when the rich are in power and no redistribution takes place in favor of the poor. When
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V r(DsjPH) < V r(AcjPH); the poor cannot prevent the rich from mounting a coup. We can
calculate , the threshold where the poor can prevent a coup, by selecting H = 1; L = 0:
V r(DsjPH) = yr + PHW + 
1   [s(y
r + PHW ) + (1  s)yr]
V r(CoupjPH) = yr + PHW + 
1   [s(y
r + PHW ) + (1  s)(yr + PLW )]  (1  )yr
Solving the equality V r(DsjPH) = V r(CoupjPH) gives the threshold value  as:
 = 1  
1  
(1  s)PLW
yr
(10)
For  > , the possibility of unconsolidated regimes arises, since the poor cannot prevent a
coup even after the maximum level of redistribution.
Similarly, let V r(DcjPH) and V r(AcjPH) denote the payos of the rich under a consoli-
dated democracy and a consolidated autocracy respectively, which also represent the lowest
and highest possible payos for the rich. If a coup to switch from a consolidated democracy to
a consolidated autocracy is not worthwhile, the threat of a coup is not binding. We can nd
the threshold b, where the poor can prevent a coup, by selecting H = 0; L = 0:
V r(DcjPH) = yr + 
1   [s(y
r) + (1  s)yr]
V r(CoupjPH) = yr + PHW + 
1   [s(y
r + PHW ) + (1  s)(yr + PLW )]  (1  b)yr
Using V r(DcjPH) = V r(CoupjPH), we can determine b such that:
b = 1  PHW
yr
  
1  
fsPH + (1  s)PLgW
yr
(11)
For  < b, the possibility of consolidated democracy is possible, since the threat of a coup is
not working, even when there is no wealth being distributed to the rich.
Let V p(AsjPH) denote the payo when the elite are in power but the resource wealth is
consumed by the poor when the price is high. This is the best possible outcome for the poor
under an autocracy. However, if this payo is not enough, even though all of the resource has
been distributed to the poor during boom periods, the threat of a revolution is still credible and
democracy is inevitable. We can nd the threshold , beyond which the rich cannot prevent a
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revolution, by selecting the maximum possible redistribution, 1  H = 1; 1  L = 0:
V p(AsjPH) = yp + PHW + 
1   [s(y
p + PHW ) + (1  s)yp]
V p(RevjPH) = y + PHW + 
1   [s(y + PHW ) + (1  s)(y + PLW )]  (1  )y
p
Setting V p(AsjPH) = V p(RevjPH), we can calculate the value of :
 = 1  1
1  
y   yp
yp
  
1  
(1  s)PLW
yp
(12)
For  > , the possibility of democratic regimes arises, since the poor cannot be prevented from
revolting even after the maximum level of redistribution.
Finally, let V p(AcjPH) denote the lowest possible payo for the poor, since no resource wealth
is being redistributed to them. Therefore, when the outcome of the revolution V p(RevjPH) is
less than the payo under the consolidated autocracy V p(AcjPH), revolution is no longer a
credible threat. We can nd the threshold b, where the rich can prevent a revolution, by
selecting 1  H = 0; 1  L = 0:
V p(RevjPH) = y + PHW + 
1   [s(y + PHW ) + (1  s)(y + PLW )]  (1  b)yp
V p(AcjPH) = yp + 
1   y
p
To derive the critical value of b, we use V p(RevjPH) = V p(AcjPH):
b = 1  1
1  
y   yp
yp
  PHW
yp
  
1  
sPHW + (1  s)PLW
yp
(13)
For  < b, the possibility of a consolidated autocracy is possible, since the threat of revolution
is not working, even when there is no wealth being distributed to the poor. The discussion
above establishes the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the society starts with autocracy, (i) for   b, it is Ac and (ii) for b <  
, it is As. If  > , (iii) for   b, it is Dc; (iv) for b <   , it is Ds and (v) for  < , it
is Du; Au.
The results are described in Figure 1. Proposition 1 states that for   b, the cost of
revolting is too high for the poor and hence dictatorship or non-democracy remains, even if
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the rich do not distribute any wealth. This is consolidated autocracy (Ac). When the cost of
revolution declines further or b <   , the rich can still be in control but need to distribute
the wealth from point-source resources to the poor. This is semi-consolidated autocracy (As).
Figure 1: Political regimes
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When  > , the threat of revolution is binding, and hence the rich must concede to
democracy. For   b, the option of a coup is too costly for the rich and the poor are not under
threat at any time, even if the poor do not distribute any wealth to the rich, leading towards
consolidated democracy (Dc). When the cost of mounting a coup declines further or b <   ,
the poor need to distribute point-source resource wealth when the price is high. But in this
case, the poor can avoid going back to a dictatorship by distributing oil revenue when the price
is high, so that the rich do not nd it protable to mount a coup. This is semi-consolidated
democracy (Ds).
If  <  and  > , the society is under the threat of coup (revolution) even if the poor (the
rich) redistribute all the resource wealth to the rich (the poor). Thus, a coup (revolution) is
unavoidable. During periods of recession, the incumbent regime is maintained; during booms,
the regimes are switched: these are unconsolidated democracy (Du) and unconsolidated autoc-
racy (Au). In a nutshell, the regimes are unstable and instability is caused by the low cost of
coups and revolutions.
3.2 Comparative Statics
The previous section showed that the moment when the poor cannot (can) prevent the rich from
mounting a coup depends on the threshold value  (^), and the moment when the rich cannot
(can) prevent the poor from mounting a revolution depends on the threshold value  (^). We
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now consider the comparative statics of political regimes with respect to wealth, inequality and
price volatility.
3.2.1 The eect of resource wealth
Partially dierentiating Equations (10){(13) with respect to wealth (W ) yields the following
lemma:
Lemma 1 An increase in W reduces ; b;  and b:
If b declines, the possibility of maintaining a consolidated autocracy where the poor can be
kept in check without any redistribution goes down. These regimes are more likely to become
semi-consolidated ones. The possibility of semi-consolidated autocracy may rise or fall as both
 and b decline. Semi-consolidated autocracies are more likely to survive than consolidated
ones, since there is more to redistribute with increased oil wealth (depicted in Figure 2).
Figure 2: The eect of an increase in point-source resources
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The eect on consolidated democracy is ambiguous, since both  and b go down. With
more oil wealth, both the poor and the rich are more likely to opt for a revolution or a coup.
Thus, the possibility of democratizing increases but the stability of this cannot be ensured. The
impact on semi-consolidated democracy remains ambiguous.
In summary, some of the regimes that were previously consolidated are forced to transfer
wealth to the non-incumbents due to a resource boom. The instability of regimes increases
unambiguously due to a fall in  and . An increase in wealth raises the benet of both
revolutions and coups. During low prices, no redistribution takes place, so both groups want to
alter the regimes to capture this.
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3.2.2 The eect of inequality
Inequality is captured by the term y y
p
yp , where an increase in the numerator reects greater
income disparity between the rich and the poor. Partially dierentiating Equations (12){(13)
with respect to the inequality term, we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 2 An increase in income inequality, y y
p
yp , reduces  and b.
An increase in the inequality of diused resources produces more benet from a revolution.
Thus a nation is more likely to democratize. Both oil wealth and inequality in diused resources
can lead to a higher possibility of democracy. However, a more equal distribution will not have
this impact on autocracy. We dier from Dunning (2009) in the sense that the main impact
of Dunning came from taxation; here, there are no taxes. The benecial impact comes from
the increased revolutionary pressure from the poor to possess oil wealth and to capture more
wealth from diused resources (due to increased inequality). In the work of Dunning (2009),
the mitigation of redistributive conict dominates the elite's incentive to stage coups against
democracy, where there is a high inequality in diused resources.
3.2.3 The eect of price volatility
Let PH = 1 +r; PL = 1 r.
Lemma 3 An increase in r increases  and , but the eect on b and b is ambiguous.
Proof. From Equation (10), we get @@r =

1 
(1 s)W
yr > 0. From Equation (12), we get
@
@r =

1 
(1 s)W
yp > 0. From Equation (11), we get
@b
@r =  Wyr   W1  f2s 1gyr ? 0: From Equation
(13), we get @b@r =  Wyp   W1  f2s 1gyp ? 0: 
Volatility implies higher prices during good times and lower prices during bad times. The
non-incumbent group at this threshold level receives the maximum amount of transfer from
the incumbent group. By mounting a coup or a revolution, the main benet is acquiring
resources during times of low prices. As the price declines further during a recession, this
benet diminishes as well. This is reected by a rise in  and  (i.e., the incumbents are more
likely to continue through redistribution). Therefore, semi-consolidated regimes are likely to
rise with an increase in volatility and we have the situation shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: The eect of an increase in price volatility 
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For consolidated regimes, the eect of price volatility depends critically on the value of s, the
frequency of high prices. If high price periods are frequent (high s) and there is no redistribution
(consolidated regimes), the benet of revolutions by the poor and coups by the rich increases
(since the ex-ante benets W r(Ac) and W p(Dc) are greater). When the high price state is less
frequent (low s), the benet is less (as W r(Ac) and W p(Dc) are lower).
For s  0:5, @b@r < 0 and @b@r < 0, implying that an increase in volatility challenges the
stability of consolidated regimes. Hence, these regimes are forced to transfer wealth to the non-
incumbent. Threats occur mainly during periods with high prices and, thanks to higher volatil-
ity, when the incumbent group has more resources to redistribute. Hence, semi-consolidated
regimes become more numerous and the number of consolidated ones declines. Under a consol-
idated regime, there is never any eective coup threat, whereas semi-consolidated regimes live
under the shadow of a coup. A semi-consolidated regime can prevent this threat by changing
the level of redistribution among its citizens.
Summarizing this analysis, we have:
Proposition 2 In economies that are rich in natural resources:
(i) Resource booms lead to more procyclical transfers and regime instability;
(ii) More unequal nations have greater pressure for democratization;
(iii) Increased price volatility leads to an increase in semi-consolidated regimes.
When a signicant amount of the point-source resource is extracted, the incumbent regime
is under pressure if the price is high. Therefore, incumbents need to transfer wealth during
these periods. Sometimes, the maximum possible transfer may not ensure the continuation of
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the regime. Thus instability ensues. Inequality in the non-resource sector makes the benet of
revolution more desirable, since complete redistribution will yield more than the mere one-time
redistribution via transfers. That is why more inequality inevitably leads to greater pressure
for democratization.
It is important to analyze the eect of the co-existence of natural resource wealth and
price volatility. Resource-rich nations have high W , which enhances political instability by
inducing a revolution or a coup. On the other hand, if there is a concomitant increase in r or
price volatility, the incumbent group is able to maintain the current political regime through
redistribution. In short, because of increased price volatility, we observe the prevalence of
semi-consolidated regimes in resource-rich nations.
Nations that are more unequal in diused resource wealth (or the societies that were unequal
before the resource was discovered) are more likely to make a democratic transition after the
point-source resource is discovered. The existence of a natural resource gives an additional
incentive for the poor to mount a revolution. The rich are less likely to contain this motive
through redistribution. Unlike Dunning (2009), we observe this phenomenon in our model
without the existence of tax.
Increased price volatility in an unequal society with an abundance of natural resources, on
the other hand, can prevent the transition towards democracy from autocracy, as the incumbent
group is more likely to stay in power through eective redistribution. Therefore, we witness a
rise in semi-consolidated regimes.
4 Diused Resource
Unlike natural resources such as oil, discussed in the previous section, diused resources (e.g,
agricultural commodities) require labor-intensive technology to appropriate their production.
Commodities such as coee and cocoa fall into this category. In this section, we examine the
role of exogenous movements in the world prices of diused resources on the political economy
of nations that are rich in these resources.
The resource wealth of the poor and the rich entirely depends upon diused resources, as
there is no point-source resource in this model. The price level of the diused resource varies
fPh; Plg and the rich possess more of the resource than the poor (yr > yp). The case of diused
resources diers from that of point-source resources in two important ways in our context:
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 Redistribution from one group to the other takes place via distortionary taxes on income
as opposed to pure transfers from the resource wealth as in point-source resources. Under
autocracy, the rich select the tax  j ; j 2 fh for Ph; l for Plg; under democracy, the poor
set the tax rate on income,  j ; j 2 fh for Ph; l for Plg:
 Unlike point-source resources, the opportunity cost of mounting a coup ([1   ]Pjyr)
or revolution ([1   ]Pjyp) depends on prices of the resource itself. We maintain the
assumption that democracy can be attained without cost.
Assume the distortionary eect of tax to be c(). Individuals, regardless of their income,
face the same tax rate and receive the same lump-sum transfer. Because of this, the most
preferred tax rate for the rich is 0 while the maximum possible tax for the poor is determined
as follows:
m = argmax f(1  )yp + (   c())yag (14)
c0 (m) =
ya   yp
ya
= 1  y
p
ya
(15)
where m denotes the median, as the median person is a poor individual and a denotes the
average.
The poor is the net gainer while the rich is the net loser. Hence, the rich prefer a lower tax
burden and the poor prefer the opposite.  () yp and   ())yr are the net transfers received
by the poor and the rich at the tax rate  . The incomes of the two groups after taxes and
transfers are:
Y p = (1 +  ( j))Pj y
p (16)
Y r = (1   ( j))Pjyr (17)
The net benet for the rich and the poor to mount a coup and a revolution are respectively
as follows:
V r(CoupjPj) = (1  (b r))Pjyr +  Z V r(S0)d   bp  S0j; tr ; br; S  (1  )Pjyr5
V p(RevjPj) = Pjy + 
1   y [sPh + (1  s)Pl]  (1  )Pjy
p
The rst two terms in the above equations constitute the total benets over time and the last
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term represents the cost. Note that in both cases, unlike the previous case, the cost and the
benet depend on the price level.
When the cost of switching regime is high for both groups, regimes cannot be switched if
prices are high, as the opportunity cost is also high. This will happen when the maximum
benet under Ph does not induce the rich to mount a coup:
V r(CoupjPh) = Phyr + EV r(Ac)  (1  )Phyr 
V r(DcjPh) = (1  (m))Phyr + EV r(Dc)
Similarly, the situation when the maximum benet under Ph is not as protable for the poor
as rebelling under Ph is:
V p(RevjPh) = Phy + EV p(R)  (1  )Phyp 
V p(AcjPh) = Phyp + EV p(Ac)
This will occur when (1 ) and (1 ) are suciently high. Otherwise, coups and revolutions
could be protable when prices are high. We can state the same conditions above when the
price is low. The following proposition summarizes this discussion:
Proposition 3 Under diused resources:
(i) Regimes are under pressure when prices are low if the cost of switching regimes is high.
(ii) Regimes are under pressure when prices are high if the cost of switching regimes is low.
Under diused resources, higher prices benet the poor directly, as their income goes up.
Thus the opportunity cost of revolution also increases. When the cost of a revolution (coup) is
very high or  ( for the rich) is very low, the threat from the poor (rich) is more likely when
prices are lower. That is why prevailing regimes become under pressure when prices are low not
high. For regimes that are semi-consolidated, transfers to the non-incumbent group are likely
when prices are lower. For unconsolidated regimes, turmoil will start at low prices not high
prices. On the other hand, if the costs of switching regimes are low (for high values of  or ),
the net benet from switching regimes is high when prices are higher.
Unlike point-source resources, in the case of diused resources, the prevailing regime could
be under threat during low prices. With point-source resources, the increase in price raises
the benet but does not aect the cost of switching regimes. This nding agrees with the
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empirical ndings of Dube and Vargas (2013), who showed that price shocks aect conict
in opposite directions depending on the factor intensity of the commodity. Using a unique
violence-related data-set from Colombia, Dube and Vargas (2013) found that a fall in the
price of coee (which is labor-intensive) increases violence disproportionately in municipalities
growing more coee. However, a rise in the price of oil (which is capital-intensive) intensies
attacks disproportionately in municipalities that produce more of these natural resources.
4.1 Analysis
The game is the same as before, except tax is used as a transfer mechanism. The expected
ex-ante benets of consolidated regimes are:
EV p(Ac) =
yp [sPh + (1  s)Pl]
1   (18)
EV r(Ac) =
yr [sPh + (1  s)Pl]
1   (19)
EV p(Dc) =
(1 +  (m))y
p [sPh + (1  s)Pl]
1   (20)
EV r(Dc) =
(1   (m))yr [sPh + (1  s)Pl]
1   (21)
The benet after a revolution has been carried out in the previous period is:
EV p(R) =
y [sPh + (1  s)Pl]
1   (22)
y =
yr + (1  )yp
1   (23)
Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2009), we assume that costs of revolutions and coups to
obey the following properties:
 Under Ph, a coup is not protable.
 Under Ph, a revolution is not protable.
 Even under Ph, the poor prefer unconsolidated democracy over revolution.
A very important dierence from the lumpy kind of resource is that the threat of changing
the regime exists during low prices when the opportunity cost of doing so is low. In the case
of point-source resources, the increase in price raises the benet but does not aect the cost of
switching regimes.
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We can ne , where the poor can prevent a coup by selecting h = m;  l = 0. We get the
following expression:
 = 1  s(m)
1  
Ph
Pl
: (24)
For  > , the possibility of unconsolidated regimes arises since the poor cannot prevent a coup
even after the maximum level of redistribution.
We can also nd b, where the poor can prevent a coup by selecting h = m =  l. We get
the following expression:
b = 1  (m)  
1  
fsPh + (1  s)Plg(m)
Pl
(25)
For  < b, the possibility of consolidated democracy is possible, since the coup threat is not
working even when no wealth is distributed to the rich.
Likewise we can nd , where the rich can prevent a revolution by selecting m =  l. We
get the following expression:
 = 2  y
yp
  
1  
[fsPh + (1  s)Plg (y   yp)  (1  s)Pl (m) yp]
Plyp
(26)
For  > , the possibility of democratic regimes arises since the poor cannot be prevented from
revolting even after the maximum level of redistribution.
We can also nd b, where the rich can prevent a revolution by selecting  l = 0. We get the
following expression:
b = 2  y
yp
  
1  
y   yp
yp
[sPh + (1  s)Pl]
Pl
(27)
For  < b, the possibility of consolidated autocracy is possible since, the threat of a revolution
is not working even when no wealth is distributed to the poor.
4.2 Comparative Statics
4.2.1 The eect of a resource boom
Suppose that output yield of both the rich and the poor goes up by a certain percentage such
that the tax rate remains constant:
c0 (m) =
ya   yp
ya
= 1  y
p
ya
(28)
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Lemma 4 An increase in resources has no impact on ; b,  and b.
A resource boom has no impact on the rich and provides no incentives for the poor to opt
for a revolution. A rise in output raises the opportunity cost for the rich as well. Therefore, the
rich decide whether to opt for a coup or not based on the tax rate only, not the absolute level
of income. As long as the tax rate remains the same, the incentive for a coup does not alter.
The poor also cannot get more out of a revolution with redistribution, since the opportunity
cost has gone up as well. For the poor, the opportunity cost measured in yyp is the same. Unlike
point-source resources, this kind of resource boom aects the opportunity cost as well. For the
rich and the poor, a resource boom (proportionately) aects both the cost and benet by the
same extent and hence there is no net impact.
4.2.2 The eect of inequality
When inequality goes up, the income of the poor becomes even lower than the national average;
yp=ya goes down for a given ya. The maximum possible tax rate goes up, since:
c0 (m) =
ya   yp
ya
= 1  y
p
ya
;
@m
@ y
p
ya
=   1
c00 (m)
< 0 (29)
Lemma 5 An increase in inequality reduces ; b;  and b.
Inequality indirectly reduces  and b by increasing the maximum possible tax rate. With
a rise in inequality, the rich have to redistribute if there is a democracy. Thus, the rich are
more eager to prevent it. There are three ways  can be aected. First of all, there is more
to gain because the rich have more assets. Secondly, the poor have a lower opportunity cost
of revolution, since yp has gone down. Both these eects lower the value of , creating more
revolutionary pressure. However, an increase in inequality leads to a rise in m or tax returns
for the poor (m). This last eect negates the other two to some extent. The eect on b is
straightforward: it goes down as the poor gain from more redistribution and a lower opportunity
cost of revolution. In short, this will lead to instability.
4.2.3 The eect of price volatility
Assume that Ph = 1 +r; Pl = 1 r.
Lemma 6 Price volatility reduces ; b;  and b.
25
Proof: From Equation (24), we get @@r =  sm1  2(1 r)2 < 0. From Equation (25), we
get @
b
@r =  sm1  2(1 r)2 < 0. From Equation (26), we get @@r =   s1  y y
p
yp
2
(1 r)2 < 0. From
Equation (27), we get @b@r =   s1  y ypyp 2(1 r)2 < 0. 
Price volatility reduces the opportunity cost of revolution when the price is low but increases
it when the price is high. This impact does not exist in the case of lumpy resources where the
cost of a regime change is invariant with prices. Since both revolutions and coups are carried
out during low prices, they become more likely events under volatility. Furthermore, during
low prices, the group in power does not redistribute, since the threats are not at work. With
high volatility, this benet increases. Thus the benet of capturing power during low prices also
increases. The eects of both price volatility and of inequality are the same; these are shown
in Figure 4.
Figure 4: The eect of price volatility and inequality in the case of diused resources
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What is the net impact? Unconsolidated regimes rise, as the threshold level for the threat
of revolutions and coups have increased. The impact on semi-consolidated regimes is nil, as the
thresholds of semi-consolidated and unconsolidated regimes increase at the same rate. Consol-
idated regimes are therefore less likely and overall political instability increases.
Summarizing this analysis, we have:
Proposition 4 In economies that are rich in diused resources:
(i) Resource booms do not increase instability;
(ii) More unequal nations face more political instability; and
(iii) Increased price volatility leads to an increase in unconsolidated regimes.
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A proportionate boom in diused resources does not intensify the pressure of revolution.
The incentive for the rich to mount a coup does not change either. Therefore, a resource boom
does not aect either democracies or autocracies. Inequality in diused resources attract both
revolutions and coups. The poor want more redistribution and the threat of revolution is more
likely to be binding. The rich, on the other hand, are opposed to redistribution, as the burden
of taxation would increase. These conicting incentives lead to political instability.
Increased price volatility decreases the opportunity cost of a revolution during recessions.
Therefore, both coups and revolutions become more probable events and political instability is
enhanced. This, however, presupposes that regimes are under threat when prices are low. If
regimes are under threat when prices are high, the reverse occurs where political instability is
reduced, due to more uctuations in prices.
In democracy, when prices are high, the poor or the incumbent group redistribute wealth
as much as possible. During low prices, as the threat of a coup is credible, less redistribution
takes place under semi-consolidated democracy. Under semi-consolidated autocracy, the reverse
happens. Hence both pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical policies are plausible, depending on the
political regime.
Unconsolidated democracies witness the maximum possible redistribution during boom pe-
riods when the poor are in power but bust periods lead to the rich being in power and less
redistribution incurs, and we witness procyclical scal policy. Unconsolidated autocracies ob-
serve the complete opposite and less redistribution is expected during boom periods in our
model.
5 Empirical Implications
Two opposing views exist regarding political instability and price shocks. The rst argument
considers the rise in price to be an increase in resource rents that induces the political non-
incumbent to challenge the existing regime. In other words, political transition takes place
when the price is high. The rst model (i.e., point-source resources) represents this perspective,
as the opportunity cost does not change but the benet of capturing resource rents increases
in boom periods. The second view considers the impact of price shocks on the incentive of
individuals to rebel. In the case of diused resources, a decline in commodity prices lowers the
opportunity cost and hence conict becomes more probable. In the second model (i.e., diused
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resources), when the cost of switching the existing regime is high, the eect of opportunity cost
becomes more prominent than that of resource rents, and political transition is likely during
bust periods { this corroborates with the second view.
According to the rst model, if the dependent variable is political stability, the impact of a
resource boom in point-source resources will be negative and that of price volatility is positive,
as more semi-consolidated regimes emerge. This prediction is consistent with the empirical
evidence of high scal volatility in these economies. During boom periods, public expenditure
rises due to popular demand, while it falls when the bust period enters into the picture.
Most oil-rich nations in the Middle East are autocratic regimes. Chaudhry (1997) discusses
how the discovery of oil led to a dramatic shift in the political landscape in the case of Saudi
Arabia. According to Ross (2001, 2004), this characteristic is not exclusive to this region
and extends to other mineral-rich nations as well. Even though our model does not predict
the prevalence of autocracy specically, our model predicts that the present incumbent can
survive via redistributing wealth to the non-incumbent during boom periods when the political
pressure is most intense. Indeed, when grassroots protests broke out across the Arab region in
early 2011 (the so-called \Arab Spring"), the Gulf Arab monarchies ramped up spending on
salaries, housing and other targeted public services to avoid potential social unrest at home.6
Therefore, if the initial regime is autocracy, we will witness the prevalence of semi-consolidated
autocracies.
The existence of greater inequality (prior to the discovery of point-source resources) induces
democratization, as the benet of a revolution increases. Despite the overwhelming evidence
of autocratic regimes in mineral-rich nations, the existence of oil has led to democratization
in Latin America (Dunning, 2009). In contrast to the Middle East, Latin American countries
are characterized by widespread inequality.7 This phenomenon is predicted by the present
framework. More importantly, democratization occurs when the price is high. In Venezuela,
increased oil revenues established democracy in 1958; while during the 1973{74 OPEC crisis,
this democratization was consolidated. In the late 1970s, when the oil price was at its peak,
also witnessed the democratization of two other Latin American nations rich in oil: Bolivia
6See Gause (2013) for a helpful discussion on the monarchial longevity of the Gulf Arab states in the wake of
the Arab Spring revolt.
7In fact, it is the high inequality in the Latin America that has helped the region to experience democracy
in periods of high oil rents. As Latin American countries are far less dependent on natural resources compared
with many states in the Middle East, the pressure on the rich for the redistribution of non-resource income may
have tipped the balance in favor of the democratizing eect of natural resource rents. See Sinnott et al. (2010,
p. 35{36) for further discussion.
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and Ecuador (Dunning, 2009). This transition is consistent with our framework, where the
incumbent groups is most vulnerable during boom periods.
Most developing nations export commodities and income is related to price shocks (Deaton,
1999). Developing countries also experience more volatility than industrialized countries (Talvi
and Vegh, 2005). In this context, the second model can be more broadly interpreted to represent
nations that experience enormous price shocks and where revenue is diused across the society
and is not appropriated by the state (i.e., these nations do not have a large amount of point-
source resources). Low prices reect bust periods, while high prices refer to boom periods. In
the diused resources model, political instability is positively related to both price volatility
and income inequality.
In these nations, according to our framework, political transition is expected to take place
during bust periods where the opportunity cost of mounting a coup or opting for a rebellion
is lower. Haggard and Kaufman (1995) have shown that many transitions to democracy in
Latin America happened during economic downturns. In particular, Argentina, Brazil, Peru,
Uruguay and the Philippines experienced democratic transitions following severe recessions.
Unfavorable economic conditions mobilized opposition movements in these economies (Haggard
and Kaufman, 1995), a prediction that is broadly consistent with the opportunity cost thesis
presented in our second model. Likewise, many coups also occur during recessions according to
Gasiorowski (1995) and Cheibub et al. (1996).
In the current set-up, for nations rich in diused resources, the only form of scal expenditure
is the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor. Given this framework, it is expected
that scal expenditure will rise during boom periods under a democracy and expenditure will fall
under a autocracy. Due to severe frosts in Brazil, the major coee producer, the coee price in
the international market rose during 1976{78. This boom had an enormous impact on the other
coee-producing nations: Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya. Except
for Colombia, where most of the gain accrued to the producers, the governments in these nations
experienced a surge in revenue. Even though scal policies diered somewhat across nations
(Little et al. 1993), the prevalence of autocracy and democracy did not make a dierence.8
Future work should incorporate other aspects of scal policy to explain the dierences.
8Colombia and Costa Rica were democracies while the rest were autocracies. In Cameroon and Colombia,
the prevalent governments were more prudent in public spending than those in Costa Rica and Cote d'Ivoire. In
Kenya, the proceeds accrued mostly to private producers but the government revenue boomed as well and public
consumption increased more than private consumption.
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Our paper only focuses upon MPE strategies. This particular equilibrium dictates that both
the incumbent and the non-incumbent rely upon myopic strategies or take actions based on the
current state of the world. Instead, if the players adopt more forward-looking strategies or base
their decisions not only on the current state but also on history, the outcomes will be dierent.
In particular, more political stability and less scal volatility are expected. Countries such as
Botswana, where scal policy is less aected by such price swings, are examples of such an
equilibrium.
Revolutions and coups inict a signicant cost in our analysis. Therefore, neither coups nor
revolutions are protable in bust (boom) periods in the case of point-source (diused) resources.
In reality, coups and revolutions could be relatively costless. If coups are relatively costless, the
threat of a coup will be maintained regardless of the economic circumstances. Under these cir-
cumstances, if revolutions are protable only in boom (bust) periods, the democratic transition
will take place during boom (bust) periods, while bust (boom) periods will witness autocracy.
Likewise, if coups are prohibitively costly under certain economic circumstances, whereas revo-
lutions are always feasible, the nation will oscillate between democracy and autocracy.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the interplay between various political equilibria and commodity
price volatility in resource-rich countries. We develop a simple model that suggests that when a
boom in mineral-based resources occurs, scal transfers tend to be procyclical and the prevailing
political system faces increasing pressure from opponents. As resource wealth is held by the
politically powerful rich, higher income inequality creates incentives for the rich to resist the
introduction of democracy by the poor. Furthermore, higher price volatility leads to more
semi-consolidated regimes, which live under the shadow of a coup. The extended version of
our theoretical model allows us to study the political consequences of resource booms and
busts under alternative types of resources. Thus, unlike point-source mineral resources (which
are capital-intensive), societies with diused resources (which are labor-intensive) face more
political instability when the world prices of commodities (e.g., coee) are low rather than
when prices are high. This is because when the export prices of diused commodities are low,
the poor majority have a low opportunity cost of mounting a revolution against the incumbent
elite.
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